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We propose a theoretical framework to analyze the conditions under which a farmer 
facing production uncertainty (due to a possible water shortage) and incomplete 
information, will adopt a more efficient irrigation technology. A reduced form of this 
model is empirically estimated using a sample of 265 farms located in Crete, Greece. 
The empirical results suggest that farmers choose to adopt the new technology in 
order to hedge against production risk. In addition, we show that the farmer’s human 
capital also plays a significant role in the decision to adopt modern more efficient 
irrigation equipment.  
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Introduction 
Irrigation water is a scarce resource for the agricultural sector in many regions and 
countries. Common procedure in past rural policy schemes was the development of 
adequate irrigation infrastructure in order to guarantee the supply of irrigation water 
as the demand for agricultural products continued to increase. However, these 
expansionary policies, which entailed a significant investment cost, have resulted in 
increased consumption of irrigation water by the agricultural sector and in increased 
physical scarcity of the resource. Water scarcity has become a concern for the policy 
makers and competitive water users, and  agriculture in particular appears to be at the 
core of the water shortage problem. The use of modern irrigation technologies has 
been proposed as one of several possible solutions. 
Several studies have attempted to analyze on-farm adoption of irrigation 
technologies using the engineering notion of irrigation water efficiency defined by 
Whinlesey, McNeal and Obersinner (i.e., the ratio of water stored in the crop root 
zone to the total water diverted for irrigation). Moreover, by technically and 
economically evaluating irrigation technologies, some combinations of water savings 
and yield increase were found to be necessary in order to induce farmers to adopt 
water conserving technologies (e.g., Coupal and Wilson; Santos; Droogers, Kite and 
Murray-Rust; Arabiyat, Segarra and Johnson). Despite the fact that these studies are 
quite appealing in analyzing the changes and the diffusion of irrigation technologies 
in the farming sector, they lack economic intuition. 
On the other hand, in the context of technological adoption models initiated by 
Zvi Griliches pioneering work on adoption of hybrid corn in the US, the analysis of 
farmers’ decisions to adopt technological innovations took a different direction.1 
Much of this research has been concerned with the socio-economic, demographic and 
 - 3 -
structural factors that determine the farmer’s choice to adopt (or not) irrigation 
technologies, and with the patterns of diffusion of the innovation through the 
population of potential adopters over time.2  Despite numerous studies in this area, the 
results of applied research are often contradictory with regards to the importance and 
influence of any given variable used to analyze farmers’ decisions. Among the 
various socio-economic, structural or demographic variables used in these studies, 
risk has been recognized as a major factor influencing the rate of adoption of any kind 
of innovation (Jensen, 1982; Just and Zilberman). Uncertainty associated with the 
adoption of any kind of agricultural technology has two features: first, the perceived 
riskiness of future farm yield after adoption and second, production or price 
uncertainty related to farming itself. 
Several authors have empirically investigated technology adoption and diffusion 
taking into account farmers’ perceptions about the degree of risk concerning future 
yield (e.g., Tsur, Sternberg and Hochman; Saha, Love and Schwart). In particular, 
Saha, Love and Schwart identify those factors that affect technology adoption and its 
intensity, under incomplete information dissemination and output uncertainty. Their 
results emphasize the role of information (and thus, improvements in farmer’s human 
capital) in the adoption of emerging technologies. Nevertheless, they explicitly 
assume that in the absence of adoption, farmers’ profits are non-random and therefore 
in their theoretical framework they assume that neither the riskiness of the new 
technology nor the farmer’s attitude towards risk affects adoption decisions. It seems 
therefore that there exists a relative dearth of research on the perceived link between a 
farmer’s decision to adopt innovations and production or price uncertainty related to 
agricultural production. A notable exception is the work by Yaron, Dinar and Voet 
who attempted to analyze the effect of price uncertainty on the degree of innovation 
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exhibited by family farms in the Nazareth region of Israel, by including in their 
adoption model a proxy of farmer’s risk tolerance towards output price variability. 
Furthermore, in a different context, Kim and Chavas investigate the dynamic effects 
of technological progress (as measured by a time trend) on risk exposure, through the 
calculation of conditional moments of yield and profit from a panel data on corn 
production from Wisconsin. Their results indicate that technological progress 
contributes to reducing exposure to risk (as well as downside risk) over time, although 
these effects vary across space. 
The present paper contributes to the relevant literature by testing how 
production risk and incomplete information affect the probability that a farmer adopts 
a new and more efficient irrigation technology. Specifically, we extend the Saha, 
Love and Schwart theoretical framework by explicitly introducing risk into adoption 
versus non-adoption decisions. In arid and semi-arid regions where water is a primary 
and scarce input, farm expected production levels (and therefore profits) become 
random because they are functions of exogenous climatic conditions.  Hence risk-
averse farmers might consider adopting a water-efficient irrigation technology (i.e., a 
irrigation equipment which enables the use of less water for the production of the 
same level of output) in order to reduce the production risk they face during periods 
of water shortage. First, we derive a structural model defining the conditions for 
adoption, when the farmer is risk averse and has incomplete information about the 
new technology. Then, the reduced form of this model is estimated using a randomly 
selected sample of 265 farms located in the island of Crete, Greece for the 1995-96 
cropping period. 
A complete analytical framework for investigating adoption decisions should 
ideally describe the time pattern of factors such as information gathering, learning by 
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doing, or accumulating resources, that may affect farmer’s decision (Feder, Just and 
Zilberman; Sunding and Zilberman).  Indeed, dynamic processes that result in 
changes to these variables would help in explaining why individuals choose different 
adoption dates (Karshenas and Stoneman). Such dynamic representations are well 
suited when one needs theoretical guidance for specification of an adoption model to 
be applied on a cross-section of individuals followed over several periods of time.3 
However, when only a cross-section of farmers or firms is available, one can only try 
to explain why, at the time the survey was conducted, the farmer or the firm chose to 
use the new technology or not.4 The common approach is then to model the 
individual’s decision in a static framework and to use binary choice models to explain 
adoption or non-adoption.5  Our article belongs to the latter group of models as our 
data contains information about the choice of a single cross-section of farmers to 
adopt or not a new and recently available irrigation technology. Our contribution 
resides in the analysis of two sources of risk (production risk and uncertainty related 
to the use of a new technology) in the model of adoption. 
In contrast with the previous literature, we propose a more flexible 
representation of uncertainty by using moments of the profit distribution as 
determinants of farmer’s decision regarding adoption of new irrigation technology. 
We build on the Antle (1983; 1987) and Antle and Goodger theoretical framework. 
The empirical analysis provides fresh insights into the link between production risk 
and technology adoption.  In particular, we show that the probability of adoption 
increases for farmers who experience higher variance of profit, and for farmers that 
face the risk of extreme outcomes. The latter effect is approximated by the fourth 
moment of profit, which captures behavior in the tails of the profit distribution (i.e. 
outlier activity). On the whole, both of these effects indicate that farmers are willing 
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to adopt in order to hedge against production risk. We also demonstrate that 
improvements in the farmer’s human capital (i.e., education level, extension services, 
farming information accumulation) generally increase the probability that the farmer 
adopts the new irrigation technology.   
These results provide guidance to policy makers contemplating the introduction 
of economic instruments, in order to create incentives for adoption of water 
conservation technologies. In particular, they indicate that policy makers should 
incorporate into the relevant cost-benefit analysis, the expected benefits that farmers 
derive from the reduction in their production risk which will be provided by adoption. 
Moreover the results show that, in addition to the use of economic instruments for 
creating incentives that induce faster diffusion of new water-efficient technologies, 
the provision of technology-related information has the same effect by reducing the 
quasi option value associated with adoption. Hence, the policy maker may use 
information-provision to induce faster diffusion of adoption among farmers.6  
Although the quantitative results derived in this study are somewhat specific to the 
region under consideration, the policy recommendations that follow apply equally to 
any rural region where the shortage of irrigation water is an issue (in arid and semi-
arid areas of Southern Europe and the US, as well as other areas). 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the 
theoretical framework used to analyze the farmer’s decision in the presence of 
production risk and incomplete information about the new technology. In section 3 we 
describe the data used in the estimation of the empirical model and introduce the 
relevant estimation procedure. In section 4 we present and analyze the empirical 
results, while in section 5 we conclude by deriving some policy recommendations.  
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Theoretical model 
We assume that farmers are risk-averse and utilize a vector of conventional inputs x 
together with irrigation water xw, to produce a single output q through a technology 
described by a well-behaved (i.e., continuous and twice differentiable) production 
function ( )f ⋅ .  Let p denote output price and r the corresponding vector of input 
prices. The farmer is assumed to incur production risk as crop yield might be affected 
by climatic conditions. This risk is represented by a random variable ε, whose 
distribution ( )G ⋅  is exogenous to the farmer’s actions. This is the only source of risk 
we consider, as prices p and r are assumed non-random7 (i.e., farmers are assumed to 
be price-takers in both the input and output markets). 
Irrigation water input is assumed to be essential in the farm production process. 
Efficiency in water use, which is dependent on the utilized irrigation technology, is 
captured by incorporating a function ( )h α  in the production function.  Farmers are 
heterogeneous in the sense that irrigation water efficiency depends on farm 
management and other farmer characteristics incorporated in vector α. The production 
function will thus be written as ( ) wq f h x ,α⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦x .   
Allowing for risk aversion, the farmer’s problem is to maximize the expected 
utility of profit, i.e.,  
 
(1)  ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )
w w
w w w,x ,x
max E U max U pf ,h x , r x dGϖ ε α ε⎡ ⎤′⎡ ⎤ = − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫x x x r x  
where ( )U ⋅  is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Given that p and rw are 
non-random, the first-order condition for irrigation water input choice is given by the 
following relation: 
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(2a)   [ ] ( )( )ww
w
f ,h x ,
E r U E p U
x
ε α⎧ ⎫∂⎪ ⎪′ ′= ⇔⎨ ⎬∂⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
x
  
(2b)  
( )( ) ( )( )
[ ]
w www
w
cov U ; f ,h x , xf ,h x ,r E
p x E U
ε αε α ⎡ ⎤′⎧ ⎫ ∂ ∂∂⎪ ⎪ ⎣ ⎦= +⎨ ⎬ ′∂⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
xx
  
where ( )U U ϖ ϖ′ = ∂ ∂ .  For a risk-neutral farmer, the ratio of input price to output 
price, wr p , equals the expected marginal product of the irrigation water input, 
namely the first term in the right hand-side of relation (2b).  However, when the 
farmer is risk-averse, the second-term in the right-hand side of (2b) is different from 
zero and measures deviations from the risk-neutrality case. More precisely, this term 
is proportional and is opposite in sign to the marginal risk premium with respect to the 
irrigation water input.  
Let us now incorporate into the above general model, the farmer’s decision  
whether or not to adopt a new, more efficient irrigation technology.  This decision can 
be modeled as a binary choice, where the farmer can choose to adopt (A=1) or not 
(A=0) an innovative irrigation technology. This innovative technology is assumed to 
increase water use efficiency, i.e., ( ) ( )1 0h hα α>  for 0<α<1.If the farmer uses the 
new technology, less water will be necessary to produce the same level of output.  In 
other words, the adoption of the new technology will reduce production risk during 
years of water shortage in the agricultural sector, induced by adverse climatic 
conditions. Under conditions of certainty with regards to the use of the new 
equipment, i.e., future costs and benefits are perfectly known at the time of adoption, 
adopting the new technology implies a fixed cost ( )1 00 0I  and  I> = and might 
change the marginal cost of water ( )1 0w wr r≠ . Denote 1x  ( )0x  the optimal input 
choices if the new technology is adopted (non-adopted).  The farmer will adopt the 
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new and more efficient irrigation technology if the expected utility with adoption is 
greater than the expected utility without adoption, i.e., 
(3)    ( ) ( )1 0 0E U E Uϖ ϖ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− >⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦    
where 
(4)  ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )1 11 1 1 1 1 1
w w
w w w
,x ,x
max E U max U pf ,h x , r x I dGϖ ε α ε⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′= − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫1 1 1 1x x x r x  
and 
(5)  ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )0 00 0 0 0 0 0
w w
w w w
,x ,x
max E U max U pf ,h x , r x I dGϖ ε α ε⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′= − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫0 0 0 0x x x r x  
are, respectively, the expected utility under adoption and non-adoption. Thus, for the 
risk-averse farmer, the first order condition for water input corresponding to the case 
of adoption is given by: 
(6)  
( )( ) ( )( )
[ ]
1 111
1
w www
w
cov U ; f ,h x , xf ,h x ,r E
p x E U
ε αε α ⎡ ⎤′⎧ ⎫ ∂ ∂∂⎪ ⎪ ⎣ ⎦= +⎨ ⎬ ′∂⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
11 xx
 
and for the case of non-adoption: 
(7)   
( )( ) ( )( )
[ ]
0 000
0
w www
w
cov U ; f ,h x , xf ,h x ,r E
p x E U
ε αε α ⎡ ⎤′⎧ ⎫ ∂ ∂∂⎪ ⎪ ⎣ ⎦= +⎨ ⎬ ′∂⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
00 xx
. 
As the new technology is more water-efficient we would expect risk-averse 
farmers who bear higher profit uncertainty to have a higher probability of adoption, in 
order to hedge against the risk of adverse climatic conditions. 
Assume now that future profit flows after adoption, are not known with certainty 
due either to ignorance of the exact performance of the new irrigation technology or 
to the higher probability of committing errors in the use of this technology. Moreover, 
buying the new irrigation technology entails sunk costs (there is a fixed cost of 
investment and some irreversibility in the decision; it might not be easy to re-sale the 
equipment). These arguments imply that additional information might possess a 
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positive value (Dixit and Pindyck). Farmers may prefer to delay adoption in order to 
get more information on the new equipment. Consequently, an additional premium 
may enter the condition of adoption. The farmer will adopt iff: 
(8)    ( ) ( )1 0E U E U VIϖ ϖ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− >⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦   
where 0VI ≥  represents the value of new information for the representative farmer, 
which should depend on the fixed cost of investment, the level of uncertainty related 
to the use of the new technology and the farmer’s own characteristics. 
 
Data and Estimation Procedure 
Data Description 
The dataset used in this study is extracted from a broader dataset, collected via a 
survey on the structural characteristics of the agricultural sector in Crete. This survey 
was financed by the Regional Directorate of Crete as part of the Regional 
Development Program 1995-99 (Liodakis). The sample is a cross-section of 265 
randomly selected farms located in the four major districts of Crete: Chania, 
Rethymno, Heraklio and Lasithi, during the 1995-96 cropping period.8 The survey 
provides detailed information about production patterns, input use, average yields, 
gross revenues, structural characteristics and the number of farms that had adopted 
modern irrigation technologies. In the sample, 87 out of 265 farms (32.8%) had 
adopted modern irrigation technologies at the time they were surveyed.  These 
technologies vary from simple sprinklers applied mainly to tree crops, to greenhouse 
integrated systems that control the irrigation of an entire plantation. Descriptive 
statistics of the variables are provided in Table 1 for both adopters and non-adopters. 
The adopting farms are of a smaller size (45 stremmas or 4.5 ha on the average) 
and with lower capital stock (2,634 euros). Although farms adopting new irrigation 
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technologies have lower profits compared with their non-adopters counterparts 
(17,087 and 20,673 euros, respectively), they exhibit higher average profitability per 
stremma (380.1 and 370.2 euros/stremma respectively). Finally, the average irrigation 
water use per stremma is 2.8 and 3.3 m³ for adopters and non-adopters respectively.  
Statistical testing (using a simple t-test9) confirms that there are indeed significant 
differences between the two sub-samples except in the case of capital stock.   
In Table 1 we also present information on the socio-economic and structural 
characteristics of the farms surveyed.  From the data presented, it is evident that older 
farmers, who are in general less educated than their younger counterparts, are not so 
eager to adopt new technologies.  The average age and educational level of farmers 
that adopted modern irrigation technologies is 36 years of age and 11 years in 
schooling, respectively, whereas for farmers using traditional technologies the 
corresponding values are 56 and 6 years.  Statistical testing confirms that there are 
indeed statistically significant differences between adopters and non-adopters at the 
1% level.   
Furthermore, farms with higher debts and subsidies are more likely to have 
adopted new irrigation technologies.  It is also interesting to note that the average debt 
for adopting farms is 2,921 euros, whereas the corresponding figure for farms which 
are using traditional irrigation practices is only 893 euros.  A careful inspection of the 
dataset, however, reveals that this difference is not associated with the adoption of 
innovative irrigation technologies.  The majority of adopters cultivate mainly annual 
crops (including those under greenhouses), and receive loans at the beginning of the 
cropping season in order to finance their operation.  Hence, although statistical testing 
confirms the existence of a difference between the two sub-samples, this finding 
should not be misinterpreted.   
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Similarly, the level of received subsidies is almost three times higher for farms 
that adopted innovative irrigation technologies compared to the corresponding level of 
subsidies paid to non-adopters; i.e., 1,194 and 444 euros for adopters and non-
adopters, respectively (the corresponding t-statistic is well above the critical value at 
the 1% level of significance).  Although subsidies refer mainly to direct income 
transfers from CAP (Common Agriculture Policy) and are thus are unrelated to the 
farmer’s adoption behavior, it seems that they provide farmers with the financial 
backing necessary for investing in new technologies. Another interesting point that 
arises from the data presented in Table 1, refers to the exposure of farmers to 
extension services (private or public), and their access to general farming information. 
Specifically, farmers adopting new irrigation technologies are visited by extension 
agents on average nine times during the cropping year, whereas farmers relying on 
traditional irrigation technologies are visited only two times on average. Furthermore, 
farmers that adopt new technologies absorb better farming related information from 
various sources (i.e., newspapers, television and radio, visits to agricultural product 
fairs and shows, sporadic attendance of seminars, meetings or demonstrations and so 
on).10 The corresponding t-test is well above the critical value at the 1% level of 
significance.  Finally, as was anticipated, farms enjoying less favorable environmental 
conditions seem to be first among the adopters of new irrigation technologies. Farms 
facing higher average annual temperature and/or lower annual precipitation are more 
likely to have adopted new irrigation technologies.  
 
The Estimation Procedure 
Relation (8) above implies that the condition of adoption requires the following 
inequality to hold:  
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(9)    ( ) ( )1 0 0E U E U VIϖ ϖ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − >⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ .   
At the time of the survey we observe farmers in a unique situation (adoption or non-
adoption), and hence we cannot estimate this structural equation.  Instead, we estimate 
a reduced-form of this equation and we focus on the impact of risk to explain the 
adoption decision.  First, in order to avoid specifying a functional form for the 
probability function of profit ( )ϖ ⋅ , the distribution of risk ( )G ⋅  and, farmer’s risk 
preferences (i.e., the utility function ( )U ⋅ ), we use a moment-based approach, which 
allows a flexible representation of the production risk (see Antle, 1983, 1987; Antle 
and Goodger).  Production risk and thus profit uncertainty are accounted for in the 
adoption model by using the sample moments of the profit distribution as explanatory 
variables of farmer’s decision. Our dataset has the great advantage of gathering 
information on farmers who had just adopted the new irrigation technology. 
Specifically, farmers were surveyed at the time the decision to adoption/not adopt was 
made.  Thus, the profit function has not yet been affected by the adoption decision 
and for this reason, moments of profit can be assumed exogenous to farmers’ 
decision.  Second, as explained earlier, there exists an additional source of risk that 
derives from uncertainty on future profit flows, which is introduced into the 
production process through the use of the new equipment.  
The cost of this uncertainty is represented by a premium (VI) in the above 
equation, indicating the value of seeking additional information. In our empirical 
model, the role of information on the adoption decision will be measured through the 
following proxy variables that determine the farmer’s human capital: the education 
level of the head of the household, the general active farming information gathering 
and, the number of extension visits. All three variables are assumed to be positively 
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correlated with farmer’s information level on the new equipment.  According to 
human capital theory, innovative ability is closely related to these variables,11 since 
these characteristics are associated with the resource allocation skills of farm 
operators (Nelson and Phelps; Schultz; Huffman, 1977).  Information gathering, 
regardless of whether it refers to the innovation itself or not, is expected to enhance 
resource allocation skills, and to increase the efficiency of adoption decisions. A 
farmer with a high level of resource allocation skills will make more accurate 
predictions of future yields and profitability and will thus make more efficient 
adoption decisions (Stigler; Huffman, 2001). Similarly, imperfect information 
concerning new technologies may bring risks associated with innovation adoption that 
may raise the possibility of committing errors.  
The estimation procedure follows two steps. First we compute the first four 
sample moments of the profit distribution of each farmer, namely the mean, variance, 
skewness and kurtosis coefficients. Second, we incorporate the estimated moments in 
a traditional discrete choice model, along with other farmer’s characteristics and the 
variables related to the farmer’s information, in order to analyze how production risk 
and information affects the decision to adopt a technological innovation. The first four 
moments of the profit distribution are derived following a sequential estimation 
procedure (see Kim and Chavas for a detailed description of the procedure).12  In the 
first step, profit is regressed on the contemporaneous input variables to provide an 
estimate of the “mean” effect. The model13 has the following general form: 
(10)    ( )i wi ix , , ; uϖ ϕ= +i ix z β  
where 1i , N= …  denotes individual farmers in the sample, ϖ  is the profit per hectare, 
x is the vector of variable inputs (labor, intermediate inputs), xw is irrigation water 
input, z is the vector of extra shifters including farmer’s characteristics (farmer’s age 
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and farmer’s supplementary revenue unrelated to farming activities), and farm-
specific characteristics (geographical location14 and aridity). u is the usual iid error 
term. Under expected profit maximization the explanatory variables are assumed to be 
exogenous and thus the OLS estimation of (10) provides consistent and efficient 
estimates of the parameter vector β.  Then, the jth central moment of profit 
( )2j , ,m= …  conditional on input use is defined as: 
(11)    ( ) ( ){ }1 jj E .µ ϖ µ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦.  
where µ1 represents the mean or first moment of profit. Thus, the estimated errors 
from the mean effect regression ( )( )wu x , , ;ϖ ϕ= − x z β  are estimates of the first 
moment of the profit distribution.  The estimated errors u  are then squared and 
regressed on the same set of explanatory variables: 
(12)    ( )2i wi iu g x , , ; u= +i ix z δ  . 
The application of OLS on (12) provides consistent estimates of the parameter vector 
δ  and the predicted values 2iuˆ
  are consistent estimates of the second central moment 
of the profit distribution (i.e., the variance) (Antle, 1983). We follow the same 
procedure to estimate the third and fourth central moments, by using the estimated 
errors raised to the power of three and four, respectively, as dependent variables in the 
estimated models.15  The four estimated moments are then incorporated into a discrete 
model of technology adoption along with farmer’s structural and demographic 
characteristics.  
Recall that the farmer will choose to adopt the modern irrigation technology iff 
(13)    ( ) ( )1 0 0*i i iY E U E U VIϖ ϖ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ − − >⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ .   
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*
iY is an unobservable random index for each farmer that defines their propensity to 
adopt a new irrigation technology.  For purposes of estimation, denote by  
(14)    [ ]0 0i iY v′ ′ + × +0 0'm k0i 0 0i 0i= z α + m α m k α , 
the indirect utility (per year) of farmer i if he is a non-adopter, and by  
(15)    [ ]1 1i iY v′ ′ + × +'m k1i 1 1i 1 11i= z α + m α m k α , 
the indirect utility of farmer i if he is an adopter. 
Vector z is a vector of regressors including all structural and demographic 
characteristics, m is the vector of the first four profit moments that introduce 
uncertainty into the model and [ ]×m k  denotes the vector containing the interactions 
between the four moments and the human capital variables. α is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated and v is the usual error term. Based on the empirical 
evidence reported in the relevant literature and on the availability of data arising from 
our sample survey, the z vector of explanatory variables contains the following:  (a) 
the farmer’s age measured in years; (b) the farmer’s educational level measured in 
years of schooling; (c) a dummy indicating general farming information actively 
gathered from other sources; (d) an aridity index defined as the ratio of the average 
annual temperature over the total annual precipitation in the area (Stallings); (e) the 
farm’s total debts measured in euros; (f) the number of extension visits to the farm; 
(g) off-farm income measured in euros; (h) a dummy denoting family-owned farms; 
(j) three soil dummies distinguishing soils of different quality (i.e., clayey sandy, 
clayey limestones, marly limestones) and; (i) three locational dummies capturing 
interregional differences (i.e., Rethymno, Heraklio, Lasithi). Finally, the variables 
measuring human capital (i.e., the farmer’s education level, active information 
gathering, and extension visits) are interacted with each of the four profit moments.  
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From (14) and (15), the probability of farmer i adopting modern irrigation 
technology is given by the following probability model: 
(16)   
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
'
0 1
'
Pr 1 Pr Pr m ki i i i i i i
m k
i i i
Y Y Y v z m m k
z m m k
α α α
α α α
⎡ ⎤′ ′= = < = < + + ×⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤′ ′= Φ + + ×⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
where 0 1i i iv v v= − , 1 0i i iz z z= − , 1 0i i im m m= − , [ ] [ ] [ ]1 0i i im k m k m k× = × − × , 
1 0α α α= − , 1 0m m mα α α= − , and 1 0k k kα α α= − . 
The binary choice model in (16) will be estimated using a Probit model, i.e. 
assuming that vi is 2(0, )N σ  and that ( ).Φ  is the cumulative of the normal 
distribution.  
Prior to the estimation of the model, we need to address the potential 
endogeneity of three variables included in model (16); farm’s debts, extension visits 
and, off-farm income.16  We do so by implementing a two-stage instrumental variable 
procedure suggested by Lee and utilized by Connelly and DeSimone. In the first-stage 
we specify all the above variables as functions of all other exogenous variables 
included in (16), plus a set of instruments.17  In the second-stage, the observed values 
of these variables (i.e., farm’s debts, extension visits and off-farm income) are 
included along with the vector of their corresponding residuals, arising from the first-
stage into the model in (16) as: 
(17)    [ ] [ ]( )1iPr Y Φ ′ ′ ′= × +'m k vi i ii= z α + m α + m k α v α   
where, iv  is the vector of the residuals obtained from the first-stage and αv is the 
vector of the corresponding parameters.  The above relation enables the consistent 
estimation of the parameters in the presence of possible endogenous variables in z.  A 
simple t-test for the significance of the coefficient vector αv is a test for the 
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exogeneity of the three suspicious variables (Smith and Blundell).18  Finally, since we 
incorporate estimated values (i.e., profit moments) in the probit equation, we use 
bootstrapping techniques to obtain consistent estimates of the corresponding standard 
errors in the probit model (Politis and Romano).   
 
Estimation results 
The two-stage instrumental variable parameter estimates of the probit model in (17), 
along with the corresponding t-statistics obtained through bootstrapping techniques, 
are presented in Table 2.  First, McFadden’s R2 exhibits a high value (i.e., 83.29) 
indicating a good fit to the model.  The signs of the explanatory variables in the probit 
model conform to our expectation that the farmers who bear more risk are more likely 
to adopt the new, water-saving, irrigation technology. The rejection of risk-neutrality 
is shown through the significance of the direct effect of three (first, second and fourth) 
out of the four sample moments included in the estimated adoption model.   
As shown in table 2, only the residuals of the extension visits equation are 
statistically significant, indicating that extension visits are endogenous to the farmer’s 
decision, when they belong to the sample that has adopted an innovative irrigation 
technology.  On the other hand, the farm’s debts and off-farm income are both 
exogenous variables as the coefficients of the corresponding residual vectors turned 
out to be statistically non-significant estimates. As far as extension services (public or 
private) are concerned, farmers that are considering adoption of technological 
innovations (including irrigation technologies) are more likely to visit extension 
agents, in order to obtain the necessary information for adequate implementation of 
the new technology.  Off-farm income, on the other hand, is often hypothesized to 
provide financial resources and to create incentives to adopt new technologies as the 
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opportunity cost of time rises. The level of off-farm income may not be exogenous 
but influenced by the profitability of farming itself, which in turn depends on adoption 
decisions.  However, in our survey, off-farm income arises mainly from non-farm 
activities (i.e., tourism) and from employment in other non-farm related sectors (i.e., 
public administration and construction work).19  Given that skill requirements are 
different for these jobs, farm and off-farm income may be realistically assumed to be 
non-competitive in the sense that the time allocated on each occupation is fixed 
exogenously (Wozniak, 1993; Lapar and Pandey).  Thus, off-farm income could be 
largely exogenous to adoption decisions, an assumption supported by statistical 
testing.  Finally, concerning the level of the farm’s debts, looking carefully at our 
sample survey we observe that the vast majority of debts arise from cultivation loans 
taken at the beginning of cropping season by farms producing mainly fresh vegetables 
in greenhouses.  Besides, at the time of the survey, 40% of the cost of adoption was 
financed by structural funds of the Greek Ministry of Agriculture.  Hence farms’ debts 
are not endogenous to the decision to adopt new irrigation technologies, which is also 
supported by statistical testing.   
Risk is found to play a prominent role in the decision to adopt a new more 
efficient irrigation technology. Risk associated with the environmental characteristics 
of the farm is found to be important. Higher aridity as well as sandy soils,20 both 
increase the water requirements of crops and thus increase the production risk related 
to adverse climatic conditions (such as droughts).  This in turn, induces farmers to 
adopt new technologies with greater water-saving potential.  Farmers’ own 
characteristics are also highly significant in the choice of adopting new irrigation 
equipment. We show that the younger and the more educated the farmer is, the higher 
the probability that he/she will adopt new irrigation technologies. The educational 
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effect as well as the positive signs associated with the variables describing exposition 
of farmers to extension services and access to general farming information may 
indicate that there exists a positive value on waiting for better information (Dixit and 
Pindyck). In other words, the farmers who have better information (through visits, 
general information channels, or education) put a lower value on the option to wait 
and for this reason are more likely to adopt than other farmers (i.e., they have a higher 
probability to adopt the new technology at the time of the survey with respect to less 
informed farmers). 
The central role of risk in farmer’s decision is highlighted through the 
significance of the sample moments. The first and second moments, which 
approximate expected profit and profit variance, are highly significant. The third 
moment, which approximates the skewness of profit is not statistically significant 
whilst the fourth moment is marginally significant at the 10% level. These results 
indicate that the higher the expected profit the greater the probability that a farmer 
decides to adopt a new irrigation technology, as he/she expects to be able to afford the 
adoption of new water-saving technologies. Moreover, the greater the variance of 
profit (and the bigger the probability of facing extreme profit values), the greater the 
probability to adopt new irrigation technologies. This allows farmers to reduce 
production (yield) risk in the periods of water shortage. This result provides evidence 
that farmers invest in new technologies as a means to hedge against input related 
production risk. Finally, the statistical insignificance of the third moment of profit 
indicates that farmers are not taking downside yield uncertainty into account when 
they decide whether to adopt a new irrigation technology. That is, while the choice of 
irrigation technology is relevant in dealing with production risk (as measured by the 
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variance of yield), these results suggest that technology choice does not affect 
exposure to downside yield uncertainty.  
Following Kim and Chavas, we can test for the nature of the exposure to 
downside risk. More precisely, we can test the null hypothesis that the profit 
distribution is symmetric, using a Wald statistic. The skewness coefficient measuring 
symmetry of the distribution is defined as ( ) ( )2 23 2s µ µ= where µj is the jth central 
moment of profit. Under the null hypothesis of symmetry (s=0), the test statistic 
( )6W N s=   (where N is the number of farmers), is distributed as a ( )21χ . If the null 
hypothesis of symmetry is rejected this constitutes evidence that the distribution of 
profit is skewed to the left (corresponding to a significant exposure to downside yield 
risk). We test for symmetry at the sample mean, and at the mean of various sub-
samples: the sub-sample of adopters and non-adopters; and sub-samples defined by 
the geographical location of farmers. In all cases but one (the sub-sample of the 
farmers located in Rethymno), we cannot reject the null of symmetry in the profit 
distribution. These results might explain the non-significance of the third sample 
moment in the adoption model.  
Interacting the four moments of profit with education, extension visits and 
active information gathering allows us to test if the amount of information the farmer 
has accumulated (through education, extension visits and information gathering) 
affects farmer’s response to risk. Active information gathering is found not to impact 
farmer’s response to any of the four moments. However, a higher education level and 
more frequent extension visits are found to increase farmer’s response to variation of 
the second moment of profit, and to decrease the farmer’s response to changes in the 
fourth moment. The former effect indicates that the more educated and informed 
about production-related technological advances the farmer is, the more responsive 
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he/she is to parameters that affect the variance of farm-profit. The latter effect  
possibly indicates that the more educated and informed the farmer is, the more likely 
he is to realize the difficulty of hedging against extreme events, which are difficult to 
predict. As a result, his probability of adopting a new technology in order to hedge 
against outlier activity in his profit distribution decreases.  
One useful expedient when undertaking a probit analysis is to calculate the 
value of the derivatives at the mean values of all the independent variables in the 
sample. The motivation is to display the derivative for a "typical" element of the 
sample. These derivatives are reported in Table 3 and represent the marginal effect of 
each regressor, approximating the change in the probability of adoption at the 
regressors’ mean. Once again, standard errors were obtained using block resampling 
techniques following the approach suggested by Politis and Romano.  The highest 
effect arises from the adverse environmental conditions (i.e., aridity index) followed 
by the first moment of profit (i.e., expected profits), farmer’s level of education and 
the number of extension visits.  Specifically, a one per cent increase in the value of 
these variables will ceteris paribus result in an increase in the probability of adoption 
by 0.046, 0.043, 0.018 and 0.017 per cent, respectively.   
As indicated in Table 3, the sample moments of the profit distribution, in 
particular mean and variance, affect the decision of the farmer to adopt a new 
technology thus confirming that farmers are not risk-neutral. The farmer’s  human 
capital, as measured by his education level, his access to information, and extension 
visits, is also found highly significant, thus reinforcing the idea that the quasi option 
value (or value of waiting to get better information) may play an important role in the 
farmer’s decision. 
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Conclusions 
In this article we develop a theoretical model to describe irrigation technology 
adoption by farmers facing production risk and incomplete information about new 
technology. The condition of adoption is derived under the assumptions of farmers’ 
risk-aversion, and assuming that uncertainty can come from two sources: randomness 
in climatic conditions and uncertainty of future profit flows associated with the use of 
the new technology. We estimate a reduced form of this equation using a randomly 
selected sample of 265 farms located in Crete, Greece. The estimation procedure is 
developed in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the first four moments of the 
profit distribution and in the second step we incorporate these estimated moments in 
the technology adoption model. Risk is found to play a central role in farmers’ 
decisions, first through the direct effect of the sample moments of the profit 
distribution in the adoption model, and second through the role of information in the 
decision to adopt. 
These results have important policy implications. Firstly, adoption of new 
water-conservation irrigation technologies can be used as a means for production risk 
management. Secondly, if farmers are risk averse, the value of the marginal product 
of variable inputs exceeds their market price. This result might lead to the erroneous 
inference that farms are inefficient in the allocation of their variable inputs and that 
regulation regarding input choices is needed. Neglecting risk considerations when 
assessing the impact of regulation policies on input choices and expected profit could 
provide misleading guidance to policy makers. This should alert all policy makers 
contemplating regulation of stochastic production process in general, and agriculture, 
in particular. Thirdly, when a policy maker is contemplating the introduction of 
economic instruments (e.g., subsidies) in order to give incentives for adoption of 
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water-conservation technologies, he should incorporate into the relevant cost-benefit 
analysis the expected benefits that farmers derive from the reduction in their 
production risk caused by adoption. Ignoring these benefits might result in potentially 
welfare-enhancing policies not satisfying a cost-benefit criterion. Finally, when the 
effect of a new technology on future profit flows is uncertain, provision of adoption-
related information induces faster diffusion among farmers, by reducing the quasi 
option value of adoption. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of the Variables 
 
Variable Adopters Non-Adopters 
Economic Data mean StDev mean StDev 
Crop Output (in Kgs) 18,234 10,078 21,439** 11,868 
Livestock Output (in 
Kgs) 1,542 
1,288 
2,504* 
1,038 
Land (in stremmas1) 45 31 56* 42 
Labour (in hours) 452 265 530 272 
Chemical Inputs (in Kgs) 12,405 11,135 16,212** 14,104 
Capital Stock2 (in euros) 2,634 1,197 3,247 1,845 
Irrigation Water (in m3) 130 125 186* 166 
Total Cost (in euros) 36,189 23,036 45,198* 32,152 
Total Revenue (in euros) 53,276 35,600 65,871* 46,474 
Profits (in euros) 17,087 15,088 20,673** 17,265 
Farm Characteristics     
Farmer’s Age (in years) 36 6 56* 11 
Farmer’s Education (in 
years) 11 
3 
6* 
2 
Farm’s Debts (in euros) 2,921 1,953 893* 687 
Subsidies (in euros) 1,194 328 444* 287 
Extension visits (No 
visits) 9 
7 
2* 
1.8 
Information (1=yes, 
0=no) 0.471 
0.50 
0.082* 
0.149 
Aridity Index3 1.188 1.8 0.603** 1.2 
Soil type: (% of farms)     
Clayey sandy 10.3  41.0  
Clayey limestones 40.2  19.7  
Marly limestones 41.4  15.7  
Dolomitic limestones 8.1  23.6  
Number of Farms 87  178  
Note: 1 one stremma equals 0.1 ha; 2 capital stock was estimated using the perpetual inventory method 
as described in Ball et al.; 3 aridity index is defined as the ratio of the average annual temperature in the 
area over the total annual precipitation (Stallings).  * (**) indicate statistically significant differences in 
the respective variables between the two sub-samples (i.e., adopters and non-adopters).  The null 
hypothesis that there is no difference was tested using a simple t-test.   
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Table 2 
Estimation Results for the Probability of Adopting the New Irrigation Technology  
Variable Estimate T-ratio  Variable Estimate T-ratio 
Constant -3.0587 (-5.0247) Profit Moments:   
Age -0.1374 (-4.8965) 1st Profit Moment 0.2628 (2.8290) 
Education 0.1954 (3.0217)    x Education 0.0748 (1.0147) 
Aridity Index 0.3895 (4.9854)    x Extension Visits 0.0074 (1.8685) 
Farms’ Debts 0.0017 (4.7458)    x Active Information 0.0857 (0.1254) 
Extension Visits 0.0952 (2.1476) 2nd Profit Moment 0.6358 (1.9658) 
Active Information 0.1504 (3.4784)    x Education 0.1248 (1.9587) 
Off-farm Income -0.0426 (-2.0748)    x Extension Visits 0.1054 (2.0247) 
Family Farming -0.0472 (-2.1275)    x Active Information -0.0505 (-0.8036) 
Soil Dummies:  3rd Profit Moment -0.2587 (-0.8625) 
Clayey Sandy 0.2236 (2.6987)    x Education 0.1628 (1.0685) 
Clayey Limestones 0.3025 (1.9674)    x Extension Visits 0.1241 (1.3258) 
Marly Limestones 0.8905 (1.0748)    x Active Information -0.1587 (-0.6544) 
Location Dummies:  4th Profit Moment 0.0758 (1.8147) 
Rethymno 0.2307 (0.2865)    x Education -0.1785 (-1.9631) 
Heraklio 0.6857 (2.0899)    x Extension Visits -0.1354 (-2.1325) 
Lasithi 0.2408 (3.1951)    x Active Information -0.2047 (-1.3258) 
Farms’ Debtsres -0.0017 (-0.1478) Off-farm Incomeres 0.0075 (0.8574) 
Extension Visitsres 0.0107 (2.2857)    
% correct prediction 92.17   
McFadden’s R2 83.29   
Note:  Standard errors were obtained using block resampling techniques which entails grouping the data 
randomly in a number of blocks of ten (10) farms and re-estimating the model leaving out each time one of 
the blocks of observations and then computing the corresponding standard errors (Politis and Romano).   
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Table 3 
Marginal Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
Variable Estimate T-ratio 
Age -0.00807 (-5.8547) 
Education 0.01808 (3.8698) 
Aridity Index 0.04569 (3.7926) 
Farms’ Debts 0.00014 (5.3658) 
Extension Visits 0.01674 (2.1736) 
Active Information 0.00337 (3.8571) 
Off-farm Income -0.01109 (-1.9808) 
Family Farming -0.00739 (-1.8231) 
Soil Dummies:   
Clayey Sandy 0.00254 (3.1369) 
Clayey Limestones 0.00132 (1.9057) 
Marly Limestones 0.00441 (1.1063) 
Location Dummies:   
Rethymno 0.00034 (0.7517) 
Heraklio 0.01308 (2.8423) 
Lasithi 0.02482 (3.0534) 
Profit Moments:   
1st Moment 0.04308 (3.9541) 
2nd Moment 0.02974 (2.0412) 
3rd Moment -0.00857 (-0.7325) 
4th Moment 0.00268 (1.9829) 
Note:  Standard errors were computed using bootstrapping techniques.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Feder, Just and Zilberman, Feder and Umali and Sunding and Zilberman provide 
excellent surveys on the technological adoption literature.  Besley and Case review 
extensively the existing empirical technological adoption models in the light of their 
consistency with an underlying theoretical model of optimizing behavior.  
2 The most indicative empirical studies analyzing irrigation technology adoption 
include those by Fishelson and Rymon,  Dinar and Zilberman, Dinar, Campbell and 
Zilberman, Dinar and Yaron and, Dridi and Khanna.   
3 As pointed out by one of the referees, this type of analysis can be adequately 
represented by a hazard ratio model that formulates the problem in terms of the 
conditional probability of adoption at a particular time, given that adoption has not 
already occurred.  This kind of models have been used in several applications related 
to technology adoption in both the agricultural and industrial sector (e.g., Rose and 
Joskow; Karshenas and Stoneman; Saloner and Shephard; Kerr and Newell; Abdulai 
and Huffman).  Stoneman provides a detailed discussion of the relevant issues in the 
light of more general technological diffusion models.   
4 Besley and Case, in reviewing the empirical models used to analyze technology 
adoption in developing countries, suggest that the use of a simple cross-section of data 
is able to provide insights into the farm and farmer characteristics associated with 
ultimately accepting the new technology but fail to explore the adoption process itself.  
They suggest the use of recall data to address this limitation (i.e., the exact time when 
farmers actually adopted the new technology). Our sample survey, however, contains 
only farms that have adopted innovative irrigation technologies at the time of survey, 
and thus it is appropriate to use them in a simple probit under the assumption that all 
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explanatory variables are indeed exogenous (this assumption is tested in the 
forthcoming sections).   
5 The most indicative studies include those by Wozniak (1984; 1993), Putler and 
Zilberman, Huffman and Mercier and, Lin. 
6 While both information and subsidy policies speed up adoption and diffusion of new 
technologies, Stoneman and David have shown that subsidy policies (which are 
frequently used by the European Union (EU) as means of promoting technological 
adoption throughout Europe) may yield welfare losses in the form of income transfers 
from other sectors of the economy.  
7 Since farms in the sample are located in a relatively small geographic area, output 
and factor price variability is low (Huffman and Mercier).  In addition, farmers face a 
minimum guaranteed price under the relevant regulation applied within the respective 
Common Market Organization of the Common Agricultural Policy.  That is, if the 
market price of output, in any particular year is lower than the minimum guaranteed 
price, farmers will receive a lump-sum equal with the difference between market and 
threshold price.  
8 The island of Crete is a semi-arid area in the south of Greece and it is among the 
major agricultural producing regions of the country accounting for the 12% of the 
total national GDP, while it contributes by 6% to the total world olive-oil production 
and by 23% to the total EU out-of-season (i.e., in greenhouses) fruits and vegetables 
production. Thus, it constitutes an indicative case-study for the empirical evaluation 
of the adoption of new more-efficient irrigation technologies.  
9 The t-test used to compare the average of variable x  between the sub-sample of 
adopters ( Ax ) and the sub-sample of non-adopters ( Nx ), is computed as: 
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, where ν≈nA+nN-2 is the number of the degrees of 
freedom, nA and nN is the number of adopting and non-adopting farms in the sample, 
respectively. 
10 Following Feder and Slade and Jensen (1988) this refers to active information 
gathering.   
11 Indeed additional schooling may affect the knowledge that the farmer has about 
how technologies might work and how to gather and analyze publications or reports 
containing technology-related information (Kihlstrom). 
12 Even though most distribution functions are well approximated by their first three 
moments, we proceed to the estimation of the fourth moment, which provides a 
measure of the variability of profit variance, a measure that might be relevant for the 
farmers’ selection of production inputs. 
13 We choose a flexible functional form for ( )ϕ ⋅  which includes inputs in levels, 
squares and cross-variables.  
14 We control for farm location among the four districts of Crete, namely Chania, 
Rethymno, Heraklio, and Lasithi. 
15 Estimation results are not reported here but are available upon request. 
16 This issue has been pointed out by one of the referees.  
17 In the farm’s debts equation we have used as instruments the size of the farm 
operation, its capital stock and a dummy indicating farms cultivating in greenhouses; 
in the extension visits equation the distance of the farm from the nearest extension 
outlet and the number of outlets in the area; while in the off-farm income equation the 
distance from the nearest city and the intensity of tourism activities in the area 
measured as the number of tourist arrivals.   
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18 This test is similar to the Hausman test for exogeneity.  Similar tests have been 
proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon and Even.   
19 In fact the 53.4% of off-farm income arises from tourism activities, 20.4% from 
public administration and 26.1% from other non-farm sectors.  
20 Crop production on sandy soils is more water intensive, as they have higher 
absorbing capacity than other types of soil. 
